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Abstract
Hong Kong’s recent Umbrella Movement was caused by factors dating 
back to the British invasion and occupation of the port of Canton. 
Though on the outside, it looked as though these protests dealt with 
the upcoming elections of the Chief Executive, they were ultimately 
protesting the fundamental system of governance in place in Hong 
Kong. Had the protests merely been concerned with electoral reform, 
they would have had no legal standing upon which to make their 
claims, with both the Joint Declaration and Basic Law supporting the 
system proposed by the People’s Republic of China. Though the protests 
gained some footing early on, they ultimately dispersed, and no electoral 
reform has yet taken place. The Umbrella Revolution, i.e. the spirit of 
disbanding and reshaping the current system of governance in Hong 
Kong, what the protesters were hoping to achieve, will ultimately fail, 
due to movement’s overreliance on youth. Young people in Hong Kong 
simply do not have enough political efficacy, nor enough economic or 
militaristic means, to institute any major changes, and with the Basic 
Law’s provisions ceasing in 2047, time is running out.
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Our saga begins in a port city enwrapped in a state of turmoil, 
teeming with life and wealth, yet lacking in liberty and equality. The city 
was fought over, controlled, and traded between world powers, erasing it of 
any identity it might once have had, leading to an ideological struggle over its 
true nature, what it is and what it might become. In the legislature, lawmakers 
must choose between what they believe is right, what the citizens want, and 
the pressures of an overarching and somewhat oppressive state government, 
which holds nearly ultimate authority. The leader of this town, elected by 
the authority state, feels not only a sense of allegiance to those who gave him 
power but also a fear of what might happen should he disappoint them. Instead 
of listening to the members of his city, he ignores them to protect himself. 
Because of this, pacts that are beneficial to the sovereign are made between 
the leader of the city and private corporations, and a combination of unbridled 
capitalism and government instated monopolies drive up real estate prices, 
making the tycoons richer, and the disadvantaged middle-class poorer. The 
citizens, sensing disconnect in the legislature, a leader not willing to listen, 
and collusion between the state and private corporations, react in the only 
way they can: revolution. Students, teachers, and workers gather outside the 
central government building in the middle of the city, and on one fateful day 
breach a security barricade, sparking a social movement. In the days that follow, 
police use pepper spray and tear gas on civilians, but because of civic outcry, 
the size of the mobs becomes even larger. The resistance movement adopts a 
symbol to represent their hope – the yellow umbrella – to protect them from 
oppression in the way their actual umbrellas protect them from the gas being 
used by the police forces to suppress them. They fight, retreat, rally, and fight 
some more, for some months onwards. Eventually, however, the state and its 
collusion with private entities prove too strong, and the rebellion is quelled. 
But the spirit that awoke the movement lives on, especially in the youth of the 
city, those who witnessed, participated, and were molded by the events which 
transpired. Although the root of these conflicts was born in 1984, this is not 
an Orwellian piece of fiction. This is a story of Hong Kong.
The following tale of Hong Kong explains why the Umbrella 
Movement occurred, from the pressure felt by the youth of Hong Kong over 
the collapse of their political efficacy, to the more recent attempts by the 
People’s Republic of China of gaining greater sovereignty over the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, to modern Hong Kong’s governmental roots 
set forth by the Joint Declaration and Basic Law. It not only claims that the citing 
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of supposed provisions for free and fair elections in the Basic Law were grossly 
misinterpreted, and that the PRC was never planning on allowing Hong Kong 
to function as a true democracy, but that he PRC is, however, allowing for a 
more democratic Hong Kong than the United Kingdom ever allowed, thus 
being chastised by the West for giving Hong Kong more autonomy than a 
Western state ever did. Finally, it discusses that though the Umbrella Movement 
was still a social movement, it was a movement asking for revolution, and 
explains how Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution is destined to fail.
I
September 26, 2014 – Exactly thirty years after the United Kingdom 
and the People’s Republic of China released the historic Joint Declaration, hundreds 
of students rushed over the security barricades of the central government building 
in Hong Kong with anger, tenacity, and fear in their eyes. Many were still 
youths, students from local secondary schools exercising their disappointment 
of modern Hong Kong in the only way they believed they could: protest. Thus 
began a series of events now known as “The Umbrella Movement.” Four days 
earlier, however, hundreds had begun gathering around that building, unhappy 
with the current political system in place in Hong Kong, furious at the way 
the Beijing government of the PRC seemed to be closing in and suppressing 
their social and political freedoms. Though the protests were meant to be 
relatively peaceful demonstrations, the large collections of people disrupted 
traffic and business throughout Hong Kong. Soon Hong Kong police forces 
were called in to disperse the crowds, and when protesters refused to leave, 
the police resorted to the use of pepper spray and tear gas, causing an uproar 
among witnesses.1 To protect themselves from the tear gas, protesters began 
carrying umbrellas to use as shields, thus the movement was dubbed “The 
Umbrella Movement.” In the following months, the protests fluctuated in 
numbers, and changed locations many times. However, the large number of 
youths who stood as the backbone of the movement remained constant. The 
young men and women of Hong Kong kept the Umbrella Movement alive 
until December 15, 2014. At this time the crowds dispersed for good, but 
those involved continued to be discontent with their lack of political efficacy 
1 “Police fire tear gas and baton charge thousands of Occupy Central protesters,” 
South China Morning Post (International Edition), last modified September 29, 2014, 
accessed August 11, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1603350/
police-fire-tear-gas-and-baton-charge-thousands-occupy-central.
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in Hong Kong’s political system.
The current political system of Hong Kong is composed primarily of 
the Chief Executive, the Executive Council, and the Legislative Council, along 
with the Administration, the Judiciary, and the District Councils. However, 
apart from the District Councils who have no legislative power, only 35 of the 
70 members of the Legislative Council are selected through free elections.2 In 
addition to this, the Chief Executive, who arguably has more power than the 
entire Legislative Council, is elected by a 1,200 member committee composed 
primarily of pro-Beijing aristocrats and corporate leaders.3 Because of this, the 
youth of Hong Kong in particular feel that they have no way of influencing the 
affairs of the government. In a Time article entitled “Hong Kong’s Youth Are 
Venting Economic as Well as Political Frustration” David Zweig, professor of 
politics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, says “The 
young people of Hong Kong are very worried that the Hong Kong their parents 
knew is not going to be the Hong Kong to which they grow up.”4 To many of 
the older generation, Hong Kong went through rapid economic growth, and 
transformed from being a Western colony to a more culturally independent 
and economic capital. But for the youth, economic stagnation can only be 
blamed on those in control. Because of this, they feel that the current economic 
woes of the city, rising property values, middling wages, and an acceptance 
of nepotism are not being accurately combated by the government. “Hong 
Kong is in a bind,” writes Carsten Holz, a professor of economics at the Hong 
Kong University of Science and Technology, “the economy is dominated by 
a few tycoons closely affiliated with the aristocratic families of the mainland 
regime and with the mainland regime’s Hong Kong puppet regime.”5 In other 
words, corporatism, through ties with the PRC, has a strangle-hold on what 
the HKSAR government can and cannot do. Therefore, the youth find no 
way to influence political matters, except through social movement. Previous 
to the Umbrella Movement, they manifested their yearly griefs through the 
2 “Government Structure,” GovHK, last modified March 2015, accessed August 11, 
2015, http://www.gov.hk/en/about/govdirectory/govstructure.htm.
3 “Hong Kong Lawmakers Reject Electoral-Reform Proposal Backed by Beijing,” 
TIME, last modified June 18, 2015, accessed August 11, 2015, http://time.
com/3923968/hong-kong-election-reform-bill/.
4 “Hong Kong’s Youth Are Venting Economic as Well as Political Frustration,” TIME, 
last modified October 7, 2014, accessed August 11, 2015, http://time.com/3477757/
hong-kongs-youth-are-venting-economic-as-well-as-political-frustration/.
5 Ibid.
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July 1 marches.
Citizens’ malcontent with portions of the Basic Law, a malcontent 
which reoccurred in the Umbrella Movement, began inciting wide-spread 
social movements in 2003. Though the “July 1 Marches” officially commenced 
in 1997, with The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic 
Movements in China at its forefront, the marches gained significant support on 
July 1, 2003. During this time, the marches grew to anywhere from 100,000 
to 500,000 marchers in reaction to an anti-subversion law proposed to the 
Hong Kong legislature on September 24, 2002.6 This law regarded Article 23 
of the Basic Law which reads:
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its 
own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against 
the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit 
foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political 
activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies 
of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations 
or bodies.7
The proposed law would have allowed for anyone found guilty of acts of treason, 
sedition, secession, or subversion against the People’s Republic of China to 
be imprisoned for life.8 The law was believed to be set to pass through Hong 
Kong’s Legislative Council. However, in the aftermath of the July 1 marches, 
two Executive Committee members resigned, and the bill lost much support 
within the chief executive’s cabinet and was eventually withdrawn.9 This was 
an extreme victory for pro-democracy citizens of Hong Kong, and culminated 
in larger support for annual July 1 marches in the future. With themes such as 
“Striving For Universal Suffrage in ’07 and ’08 …” and “Oppose government 
collusion, striving for universal suffrage,” these yearly reminders of the great 
support for democracy in Hong Kong only strengthened the idea for future 
6 “Huge protest fills HK streets,” CNN, last modified July 2, 2003, accessed August 12, 
2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/.
7 “Basic Law Full Text,” GovHK, last modified July 13, 2012, accessed August 12, 
2015, http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_2.html.
8 “Huge protest fills HK streets,” CNN.
9 “Hong Kong leader abandons fight to pass anti-subversion laws,” The Telegraph, last 
modified July 8, 2003, accessed August 12, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/hongkong/1435551/Hong-Kong-leader-abandons-fight-to-pass-anti-
subversion-laws.html.
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social movements in the minds of young, aspiring protesters. Growing up 
around such strong ideals could only influence the youth of Hong Kong in 
one-direction: toward democracy.
The most recent attack of note by the People’s Republic of China on 
Hong Kong’s sovereignty was a 23,000 word document released by the China 
State Council Information Office in which the PRC declared “comprehensive 
jurisdiction” over Hong Kong. The paper essentially declared that the PRC 
holds ultimate sovereignty over the Special Administrative Region of Hong 
Kong, which, according to the Joint Declaration, was supposed to be guaranteed 
a “high degree of autonomy” until 2047. This announcement made on June 
11, 2014 was immediately met with backlash from Occupy Central with 
Love and Peace, an organization known for promoting democratic reforms 
throughout Hong Kong. In the following days, Occupy Central, along with 
other pro-democracy advocates, organized a civil referendum for the people 
of Hong Kong to demand democratic reforms of the political system of Hong 
Kong, and for the direct nomination and election of the Chief Executive by 
the citizens of Hong Kong. Though the referendum gained 787,767 votes, with 
42% agreeing that the Chief Executive should be nominated by the people 
of Hong Kong, it ultimately failed due to its unofficial status.10 The People’s 
Republic of China reacted to this with an article in the state-run newspaper 
calling it an “illegal farce.”11 Then, on August 31, 2014, the PRC proposed an 
electoral system in which those nominated and appearing on the ballot for the 
position of Chief Executive would be selected by a 1,200 member nominating 
committee, although election itself would still technically take place through 
“universal suffrage.” That nominating committee would be selected and 
appointed by the People’s Republic of China, and will be instructed to only 
nominate individuals who “love the country, and love Hong Kong” to appear 
on the ballot.12 Naturally, this enraged pro-democracy groups throughout 
Hong Kong, who believed this meant only “pro-Beijing” candidates would 
have any chance at becoming the Chief Executive. The public’s reaction to 
this 1,200 member nominating committee ultimately led to the crowd of 
10 “Hong Kong’s Occupy Central democracy ‘referendum’ – What you should know,” 
CNN, last modified June 30, 2014, accessed August 12, 2015, http://www.cnn.
com/2014/06/24/world/asia/hong-kong-politics-explainer/index.html.
11 Ibid.
12 “China restricts voting reforms for Hong Kong,” The New York Times, last modified 
August 31, 2014, accessed August 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/
world/asia/hong-kong-elections.html?_r=0.
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demonstrators outside the central government building, and therefore sparked 
the Umbrella Movement.
While the People’s Congress in Beijing officially proposed this 
new electoral system, the Legislative Council of Hong Kong was still 
required to pass the bill for it to go into effect. To much of the world’s 
surprise however, on June 18, 2015, the bill failed in dramatic fashion. 
On that day, after the Speaker rejected the pro-Beijing camp’s request for 
a 15-minute suspension, the group of lawmakers believed they could buy 
enough time with the walkout to suspend the vote.13 But due confusion 
among members, an insufficient number of lawmakers walked out, and the 
attempt failed. Where there should have been many more votes in favor 
of the new system, only 8 legislators were present who supported the bill 
when the vote took place.14 Thus only 37 out of 70 lawmakers were present 
for the vote, with only 8 affirming the bill, far less than the 47 needed 
for it to pass.15 The failure of the bill and the grand display of disconnect 
within the pro-Beijing camp caused the whole event to be extremely 
embarrassing for the bill’s supporters, including the PRC. Because the bill 
failed, the election of the Chief Executive in the 2017 election will continue 
to be carried out by a 1,200 member electing committee, the same system 
previously in place in Hong Kong. What is notable to point out, however, 
is that the current system, the system voted for by many pro-democracy 
legislators, is much less democratic than the system proposed by the Beijing 
government. While this would have allowed citizens to cast their votes in 
who became the next Chief Executive, they would be choosing from a list 
compiled by a pro-Beijing nominating committee. Still, Hong Kong voters 
would have had more political efficacy had the bill passed. Instead of the 
election committee, a nominating committee would have been in place, 
and the voters could have had some say in who they wanted to be Chief 
Executive. But pro-democracy supporters in Hong Kong are still pushing 
for more drastic reforms to be made by the Beijing government. They 
looked at the proposed system as too great of a compromise, which they 
believed would have created a stagnant system of unchanging structure in 
Hong Kong. Even so, the new system would have been more democratic 
13 “Hong Kong lawmakers reject Beijing poll plan,” BBC, last modified June 18, 2015, 
accessed August 13, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33179247.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
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than the old system in China’s Hong Kong, and much more democratic 
than the system in place when Hong Kong was under British rule. It was 
ultimately this British system that laid the foundation for the modern political 
system of Hong Kong, but interestingly enough, there were never any grand 
protests during British rule.
II
The current political system in Hong Kong, i.e. the semi-sovereignty 
the PRC has over that system, was structured through two documents: the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. However, the influences over 
the composition of these documents began during the age of colonialism, 
and the First Opium War.
In the early nineteenth century, Britain supplied China with opium 
in exchange for silver and tea, but in 1839, after the emperor of China 
named a new imperial commissioner for the port of Canton, all opium trade 
ceased.16 Naturally the British were enraged, as they were dependent on 
selling opium to receive tea, which was (and is) very popular in England. 
In a short period of time, Britain had invaded, under what it claimed as its 
“responsibility to protect British citizens,” demanding that China open its 
ports back to the English opium trade.17 Having underestimated the British 
force, China soon conceded, and thus reengaged in trade with England. 
In the Treaty of Nanking, which ended the conflict, China also ceded the 
small island of Hong Kong to the British.18
Hong Kong was then officially a British territory, and had no real 
government or constitution separate from that of the United Kingdom. In 
the years following the Treaty of Nanking, however, some rudimentary 
laws were set in place. Three basic constitutional documents were written 
and approved: the Charter of April 5, 1843, which constituted the island of 
Hong Kong as a colony; the Order in Council of October 24, 1860, which 
annexed the peninsula of Kowloon to the original colony; and the Order 
of Council of December 27, 1898, which added new territories to it.19
The Charter of 1843, which included the Letters Patent and Royal 
Instructions, formulated the system of government that remained in place 
16 Norman Miners, The Government and Politics of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Oxford 
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during Hong Kong’s colonial era. It founded the office of Governor and 
defined its powers, which were to make laws for the peace, order, and 
good government of the colony.20 The Letters also authorized the creation 
of the Executive and Legislative Councils. The Executive Council was to 
be composed of chief government officials, all of whom were appointed 
by the Crown. Dr. Norman Miners, Professor of Political Science at 
the University of Hong Kong, writes that the Executive Council was 
“the authoritative final decision maker for the whole of the government 
machine, and though many of [its] conclusions were legally subject to 
ratification elsewhere … in practice this was normally achieved without 
much difficulty.”21 The Legislative Council was composed of 57 members, 
who were appointed by the Governor.22 The true purpose of the Letters 
was to make sure the governance of Hong Kong continued to be subject 
to the British Crown and Parliament. The system contained almost no 
characteristics of a democracy until 1985, when 24 of the 57 members of 
the Legislative Council were allowed to be elected through competitive 
election.23 This relatively undemocratic system of government remained in 
Hong Kong until 1997, when it was returned to the PRC.
The reason why Britain ceded sovereignty of Hong Kong back to 
the PRC instead of retaining the port as a colony began with The Order of 
Council of 1898. This document leased the “New Territories” surrounding 
Hong Kong for 99 years, a lease which ran out in 1997. Because of this, in 
the late-1970s, individuals living in or owning land in the New Territories 
began feeling nervous about what would occur when that land would be 
handed over to the communist PRC.24 These land owners urged the British 
Government to come up with an agreement with the PRC that would 
allow them to retain property rights over their land. China realized this 
was an opportunity to regain sovereignty over the island of Hong Kong 
and the Kowloon peninsula, and therefore reacted accordingly. The result 
of this was the Joint Declaration of 1984.
After many talks and conferences between the UK and the PRC, 





24 William McGurn, Perfidious Albion (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy 
Center, 1997), 43.
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outlined what would happen to the British Colony of Hong Kong on and 
after July 1, 1997. The main sections of the Joint Declaration pertinent to 
our story of Hong Kong are the following:
i. 3. (1) Upholding national unity and territorial integrity, and taking 
account of the history of Hong Kong and its realities, the People’s 
Republic of China has decided to establish…a Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region upon resuming the exercise of sovereignty over 
Hong Kong.
ii. 3. (4) The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region will be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive 
will be appointed by the Central People’s Government on the basis 
of results of elections or consultations to be held locally. Principal 
officials will be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region for appointment by the Central People’s 
Government…
iii. 3. (5) The current social and economic systems in Hong Kong 
will remain unchanged, and so will the lifestyle. Rights and freedoms, 
including those of the person, of speech, of the press, of assembly, of 
association, of travel, of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of 
choice of occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will be 
ensured by law in the Hong Kong Special Administrative region. Private 
Property, ownership of enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and 
foreign investment will be protected by law.25
The government of the United Kingdom relinquished its sovereignty over the 
island of Hong Kong and the Kowloon peninsula to ensure that the property 
rights and freedoms of those living in the New Territories were protected from 
the potential communist agendas of the PRC. The Joint Declaration makes clear 
that Hong Kong would be considered a Special Administrative Region with 
rights and privileges distinct from the PRC. The new governmental system 
of Hong Kong would be very similar to the old government, with the only 
25 “Text of Joint Declaration,” GovHK, accessed August 13, 2015,  
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/blis_ind.nsf/
CurEngOrd/034B10AF5D3058DB482575EE000EDB9F?OpenDocument.
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changes being that the Governor would then called the Chief Executive, and 
all appointments would be made by the PRC instead of the British Crown. 
These rights were later solidified in the Basic Law. 
The Basic Law, adopted on April 4, 1990 by the People’s Congress of 
the PRC, serves as the current “constitution” of Hong Kong. Article 11 of the 
document clearly states, “No law enacted by the legislature of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region shall contravene this law.” Though many of its 
sections restate portions of the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law also includes details 
pertaining to the future of Hong Kong. Article 5 states, “The socialist system 
and policies shall not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
region, and the previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged 
for 50 years.” In relation to the Umbrella Movement, however, there is one 
article in particular that needs to be analyzed: Article 45. It reads:
The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be 
appointed by the Central People’s Government.
The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the 
light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly 
progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive 
by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative 
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.26
The Basic Law gives autonomy to the government of Hong Kong for domestic 
procedures, but grants no electoral autonomy on the subject of the Chief 
Executive to the city. It clearly states that “The ultimate aim is the selection 
of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly 
representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic 
procedures.” There is no clear definition of what a “broadly representative 
nominating committee” is, but the 1,200 member committee based upon a 
wide range of social groups seems to fit the description. In the new system, 
universal suffrage would still take place. Though interpretations of the phrase in 
different contexts may vary, the words “universal suffrage” themselves simply 
26 “Basic Law Full Text,” GovHK, last modified July 13, 2012, accessed August 13, 
2015, http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/chapter_4.html
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imply that every adult citizen has the freedom and opportunity to vote, which, 
in the new system, would be the case. The proposed electoral system was also 
in accordance with the Joint Declaration, which was ratified and accepted by the 
United Nations and states “The chief executive will be appointed by the Central 
People’s Government on the basis of results of elections or consultations to be 
held locally.” With the proposed electoral system, the elections that would have 
occurred would have been held locally, in Hong Kong, and the PRC would 
have appointed the Chief Executive based on the results of those elections. The 
PRC did not violate any laws or constitutions in their creation of an appointed 
nomination committee. They were actually allowing citizens of Hong Kong 
more political efficacy than in previous years in regards to who becomes the 
next Chief Executive. The PRC never intended for Hong Kong to function 
as a true democracy, but has been chastised by the West for attempting to give 
Hong Kong more autonomy than the United Kingdom ever did.
Obviously these sections of the Basic Law and Joint Declaration are 
extremely detrimental to the Umbrella Movement’s cause. Near the beginning 
of the movement, there was some disagreement over whether to call it the 
“Umbrella Movement” or the “Umbrella Revolution,” and this concrete 
legality of the new system is precisely why. While most people claimed that 
the two terms were synonymous, they really refer to two fundamentally 
different things. Encyclopedia Britannica defines a social movement as a 
“loosely organized but sustained campaign in support of a social goal, typically 
either the implementation or the prevention of a change in society’s structure 
or values.”27 Based on this definition, the Umbrella Movement is certainly 
a social movement, composing of an organized and sustained campaign 
supporting the prevention of the Beijing-proposed governmental system and 
the implementation of a new, completely democratic system. In contrast, the 
Merriam-Webster defines a revolution to be “a fundamental change in political 
organization; especially the overthrow or renunciation of one government 
or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed.”28 The Umbrella 
Movement was protesting for a revolution to occur, but it was not a revolution 
itself. Because of this, the events of September 26 to December 15 of 2014 
should be considered the true “Umbrella Movement,” and the ongoing struggle 
27 “Social Movement,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed August 13, 2015,  
http://www.britannica.com/topic/social-movement.
28 “Revolution,” Merriam-Webster, accessed August 13, 2015,  
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/revolution.
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for a truly democratic Hong Kong, because it involves not only a change in 
government, but a change in constitution, to take place, is the true “Umbrella 
Revolution.” Thus these terms should, in fact, refer to different things, and 
though the Umbrella Movement of 2014 has ceased, Hong Kong’s Umbrella 
Revolution is ongoing. However, due to the revolution’s abundance in proportion 
of youths to elders, it will ultimately fail.
III
As we touched upon earlier, the younger population of Hong Kong 
are much more dissatisfied with their current situation than those of middle to 
late age. A recent survey conducted by the University of Hong Kong found that 
though 40% of Hong Kong citizens aged 50 or above held trust in the Beijing 
Government, only 27% of those aged 30-49 and only 11% of those aged 18-
29 trusted the PRC.29 Perhaps even more notable is that 85% of the youngest 
group (18-29), a staggering majority, answered that they had no-confidence 
in the “one country, two systems” policy set forth by the Joint Declaration and 
Basic Law. 59% of those in the middle group (30-49) agreed.30 Perhaps even 
more interesting is that according a study published by two academies on 
Ming Pao, over 75% of Umbrella Movement protesters were under the age 
of 39.31 Coupling these two statistics together, it is easy to see that a majority 
of the protesters were not just unhappy with the new electoral standards set 
forth by the PRC, they were unhappy with the “one country, two systems” 
philosophy altogether. The revolution is not about the new system the PRC 
proposed, or what “universal suffrage” actually means, it is about the fact that 
the Basic Law itself is a flawed document, and that the citizens of Hong Kong 
deserve greater political freedom than it allows. Because so many protesters 
were under the age of 39, it can be assumed that a large portion were born near 
or after the signing of the Basic Law, and through social contracts were “born” 
29 “HKU POP releases the latest trust and confidence indicators,” HKU POP SITE 
(Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong), last modified September 
23, 2014, accessed May 24, 2015, http://hkupop.hku.hk/english/release/release1186.
html.
30 Ibid.
31 “After umbrella sports, farewell politically apathetic age,” Ming Pao, last modified 
November 28, 2014, accessed May 24, 2015, http://news.mingpao.com/pns/後雨
傘運動：告別政治冷感的年代-作者:鄭煒、袁瑋熙/web_tc/article/20141129/
s00012/1417197542046, (obviously this broken-English title of the article is not  
what the authors intended, but as I do not speak Chinese, through a little help from 
Google Translate I was able to read the article, and I have thus given the “translated” 
article title).
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into consenting to it. Though this is the case for everyone around the world, 
with the signing of the Basic Law being so recent, it has created an ideological 
cleavage. On one hand, the young are very discontent with the document, 
but on the other, the elders can recall how undemocratic the British system 
was, and therefore accept the Basic Law for what it is. But for these youth of 
Hong Kong, the only outlet they have for voicing their malcontents is through 
revolution, for the very system they revolt against is the one which prevents 
them from taking political action. Unfortunately for them, however, the deck 
is stacked against them, and democratization will never occur in Hong Kong.
Before a democracy can be instated in any authoritarian country, 
a very specific and significant process must occur. Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, 
professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, writes in Competing 
Chinese Political Visions that there are six factors that determine the course 
of democratization: elite, class, cleavage, geopolitics, political culture, and 
social movement.32 Naturally, no political theory can predict the outcome 
of certain events with absolute certainty. If only one or two of the criteria 
for democratization are met, as is the case in our Hong Kong, it would truly 
take a miracle for democratization to occur. Since we have already touched 
on ideological cleavage between age groups in Hong Kong, and we have 
obviously covered social movement, the remainder of this section will discuss 
why the youth of Hong Kong (and therefore the revolution as a whole) fail 
the remaining four criteria for democratization.
Concerning the political elite, Shiu-Hing Lo writes, “In the event 
that the dominant elite, or the soft-liner, adopts a liberal-minded and tolerant 
attitude toward public criticisms and citizen protests, and that it accepts the 
electoral defeat of the ruling party, a threshold in democratization – the 
rotation of political party in power – is reached.”33 In other words, those who 
are currently in power must be willing to convert their government from an 
autocracy to a democracy, because without their willingness, in the absence of 
a coup, any change in regime would be impossible. But in Hong Kong, because 
of the political system set up by the Joint Declaration and Basic Law, the People’s 
Republic of China had and has the most political power and is largely in charge 
of the how the system of governance functions. Yes, the Legislative Council 
of Hong Kong still has to approve whatever changes the PRC makes to the 
32 Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, Competing Chinese Political Visions: Hong Kong vs. Beijing  
on Democracy (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2010), 2.
33 Ibid.
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functionality of HKSAR, but as we saw earlier this year, with the Legislative 
Council’s rejection of the proposed electoral system, nothing changed. The 
PRC announced they would not attempt to revamp the system in favor of 
what the pro-democracy supporters had in mind. Since the Legislative Council 
cannot do anything itself to change the electoral process, Hong Kong is stuck 
with a 1,200 member election committee and controlled by the PRC. Thus, 
the political elite in Hong Kong do not have enough efficacy themselves to 
change the system to become more democratic for the citizens of Hong Kong, 
and, even if they did, might not even listen to the qualms of the youth. In a 
fact sheet released by the Research Office of the Legislative Council Secretariat 
on October 23, 2014, the average age of a Hong Kong legislator is listed as 
57 years old, with the oldest member being 78, and the youngest 35.34 From 
here it is easy to draw the conclusion that the Hong Kong Legislative Council 
is much more content with the Basic Law and the governing procedures set 
forth by it than the youth and protesters of Hong Kong are. What is truly 
detrimental to the revolutionaries’ cause, however, is the fact that the closer 
they get to becoming the age group in power in Hong Kong, the closer the 
end of the 50 years of semi-autonomy promised by the Joint Declaration looms. 
2047 is barely 30 years away, and in the nearly 20 years which have already 
passed there has been no significant change. It’s difficult indeed to then imagine 
anything great changing in that near future. By the time Hong Kong’s current 
youth are being elected into the Legislative Council, even if they can issue in 
some sort of reform, it will be extremely short lived. Whatever change they 
can usher in will die when their lease on autonomy runs out. 
The second factor influencing democratization, class, is well described 
by David Potter, who stated that, historically speaking, “democratization has 
been both resisted and pushed forward by the changing dynamics of class 
relations and different classes pursuing their separate interests. Subordinate 
classes have usually pushed for democracy, dominant classes nearly always 
have resisted it.”35 The land-owning class has historically been the most anti-
democratic because democracy is seen as harmful to profits. In retaliation the 
peasantry or farm laborers have often been pro-democracy, but are usually too 
unorganized and uneducated to make any viable push for change. The urban 
34 “Legislative Council in Figures,” GovHK, last modified October 23, 2014, accessed 
August 22, 2015, http://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/english/1415fs02-
legislative-council-in-figures-20141031-e.pdf.
35 Ibid, 4.
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workers on the other hand are both pro-democracy and organized, and typically 
contribute the greatest force for democratization. Finally, the bourgeoisie are 
often ambiguous, for democracy will tend to allow them more freedom for 
their capitalism, but also more protection for the labor of the working class. 
However, historical analyzations of class democratization simply does not apply 
to the modern world, and especially not in Hong Kong.
The recent Umbrella Movement and the resulting Umbrella 
Revolution are composed almost entirely of the disadvantaged middle class 
and youths, and led primarily by academics, students and professors who are 
well-educated about the current political process and who understand why it 
needs to change. Though the protests themselves disrupted economic activity 
in the city, the fact that they have ceased means no part of the revolution is 
currently affecting how the economy functions. According to Richard C. Bush, 
director of the Center of East Asia Policy Studies, this is the most important 
factor in a revolution succeeding. Bush writes in his article “The Roots of the 
Hong Kong Protest” that:
In most advanced societies, democracy provides a check against excessive 
wealth and market concentration. Not in Hong Kong. Beijing designed 
the territory’s political system to limit the scope of democracy and 
give preferential access to political power to its supporters (mostly 
wealthy businessmen, some members of communist trade unions) … 
the question is whether middle class protest cause enough damage to 
business that the tycoons themselves decide that more democracy will 
actually enhance stability rather than undermine it.36
Without protests which disrupt their profits the tycoons have who have 
the power in Hong Kong have no reason to lobby for democracy. More 
importantly, because so many of Hong Kong’s youth are either in school or 
cannot find employment, forcing the hand of the corporate oligarchs without 
major support from the upper-middle class would be extremely difficult. To 
give an idea of how much power these oligarchs actually have, in 2014, the top 
45 billionaires in Hong Kong had a combined net worth of $214 billion, nearly 
36 “The Roots of the Hong Kong Protest,” Brookings Institution, last modified September 
30, 2014, accessed August 22, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/
posts/2014/09/30-roots-of-hong-kong-protest-bush.
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80% of Hong Kong’s total GDP in 2013.37 It would be nearly impossible for 
one of Hong Kong’s revolutionary youths to gain enough wealth to actually 
gain enough efficacy to influence political events through lobbying. Indeed 
even if one did, 2047 is only 32 years away when all hopes of democracy may 
very well be dashed.
The third factor leading to the failure of the Umbrella Revolution, 
geopolitics, affects democratization in a very direct way. Just as Vietnam and 
North Korea fell to communism after China’s revolution, states surrounded 
by democratic regimes have tended to become more democratic. In the past, 
ideologies quickly spread, by word of mouth or mail, and across state borders, 
allowing those who were oppressed to hear about newer, more egalitarian 
political systems. While in the current age of the internet the geographical 
spread of ideology is not as common, the economic dependence of countries 
close to one another forces cooperation between regimes, which tends to come 
in the form of similar political structures.
Hong Kong is at a dynamic place geographically, economically, 
and internationally. The most notable aspects of its geopolitics are its history 
as a British colony and China’s political and economic strangle-hold over it. 
As previously touched upon, the British rule of Hong Kong as a true colony, 
with all the lack of rights and privileges granted it thereof, forced its citizens 
to become accustomed to colonial rule. This is essentially the same rule that 
the PRC currently has over them. Because of this, the older citizens are more 
content with the current system, and the younger citizens are stuck without 
enough pressure to place by themselves on those in power. In addition, China’s 
grip on power within Hong Kong can only be bolstered through its growing 
power over Hong Kong’s economy. Since 2005, not only have Hong Kong’s 
exports to the PRC decreased, its imports from the PRC have been steadily 
increased.38 With such a one-sided economic relationship with mainland China, 
Hong Kong cannot afford to antagonize a government that clearly desires that 
the Umbrella Revolution fail. So unless Hong Kong’s youth can fix Hong 
Kong’s growing economic dependence on the PRC, the revolution cannot 
hope to gain footing.
Finally, political culture pushes democratization through a state’s core 
37 “Beyond The Umbrella Movement: Hong Kong’s Struggle With Inequality In  
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ideology. Western civilizations evolved to place stress on individuals, and in 
contrast the East exalted collectivism. It is, therefore, no surprise that democracy, 
and liberal democracy at that, succeeded greatly in the West, but struggled to find 
footing elsewhere. Capitalism, individuality, and even the definition of property 
itself grew out of Western philosophy and religion. By contrast Eastern philosophies 
stress respect, peace, harmony with the world, and further the idea that it is better 
to simply be an average laborer, a cog in a larger machine, than to push back, and 
break the machine as a whole.
Since we are discussing the subject of political culture, it seems only 
appropriate to quote Samuel Huntington, who wrote in his Clash of Civilizations that:
China’s Confucian heritage, with its emphasis on authority, order, hierarch, 
and the supremacy of the collectivity over the individual, creates obstacles 
to democratizations. Yet economic growth is creating in South China 
increasingly high levels of wealth, a dynamic bourgeoisie, accumulations of 
economic power outside governmental control, and a rapidly expanding 
middle class. In addition, Chinese people are deeply involved in the outside 
world in terms of trade, investment, and education. All this creates a social 
basis for movement toward political pluralism.39
Unfortunately, Huntington’s 1996 essay now seems out of date. The “dynamic 
bourgeoisie” he spoke of now collude with the Chinese government to only grow 
richer instead of using their wealth to push back against political oppression. In 
addition to this, as stated many times before, Hong Kong’s older age groups’ “political 
culture” is still more Confucian, and more accepting of both their “place” in the 
world and their submission to authority. Only the young, who were born near or 
after the return of Hong Kong to the PRC, seek liberalization. But again, by the 
time all of Hong Kong will have this new political culture, 2047 will have come 
and gone, removing any autonomy the new political culture could have ushered in.
To conclude, the Umbrella Movement is the most recent in a series of 
social movements that have occurred in Hong Kong since its return to PRC rule 
in 1997, with the other main event being the July 1 marches of 2003. The July 
1 marches have been used to show the populous’ support for increased political 
autonomy every summer. Half a million citizens showed up in 2003, and a 
smaller but still confidently large number attended every year since. These 
39 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 228.
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movements have given hope to many who believed that a peaceful solution 
could be reached in which Hong Kong would be given democratic elections of 
the Chief Executive and legislative Congress. The Umbrella Movement took 
the same idea, but on the anniversary of the signing of the Joint Declaration used 
a more forceful protest to make their point clear. For days, weeks, and even 
months, the movement looked as though it had a solid footing. But a year has 
now passed, and the results of the protests are thoroughly disappointing. No 
change has been made in the election process of the Chief Executive, and many 
citizens of Hong Kong have cried tears for the oppression of their autonomy, 
with or without the use of tear gas. The Umbrella Movement and the current 
Revolution has attracted support from the young, but it has simply not attracted 
enough of the middle-class or elite to gain the numbers or power needed to be 
truly effective. Perhaps a significant will occur on some eventful day this year 
or in the years to follow, but as of right now, the Umbrella Movement was a 
failure, and the current struggle for a democratic Hong Kong will be a failure 
as well. There are too many obstacles that Hong Kong must overcome in order 
to change the Basic Law and receive the true democracy it desires.
With an individualistic and liberal culture, Western states looked at 
the protests occurring in Hong Kong and still believe Hong Kong should be 
guaranteed a right to free and fair democratic elections. But in doing this, they 
ignored the history behind what Hong Kong is: a piece of land that was traded 
from one state to another, and that has been stepped on by superpowers for its 
economic prosperity. They completely ignored the constitution and foundational 
documents that modern Hong Kong was founded upon. The Basic Law provided 
many rights to the citizens and property owners of Hong Kong, but it protected 
the sovereignty of the People’s Republic over that Special Administrative Region. 
Hong Kong never had democracy, its constitution shows that it never legally 
should, and the result of this revolution are that it never will. It was a colony, is 
a colony, and will remain a colony, as long as China’s red flag flies.
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